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Do YOUR JOB AND GET SUED FOR IT!: WHAT THE FUTURE
HOLDS FOR REPRESENTATIVES*

Members of the legislative branch are the only government officials who are granted any immunity in the Constitution. While

the immunity granted in the speech or debate clause is absolute, it does not extend to many acts that the public demands

representativesperform: Conversely, the members of the executive and judicial branches receive no constitutional immunity,

but have been accorded federal common-law immunity thatcovers those duties that the public expects of them. The Auth6r

assumes the legitimacy of this non-constitutionalimmunity and
argues that it shold be applied to representativesas expansively
as it is to members of the other branches.

It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about
what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and -to
embody the wisdom and will of its constituents . . . . The in-

formingfunction of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
Woodrow Wilson'

CONSTITUTION'S SPEECH or debate clause grants
federal congressional representatives 2 immunity from suit for
their actions in "either House." 3 These protected actions have
been described as the deliberative process,4 the legislative process,5

THE

* The author would like to thank Professor Karen Nelson Moore for her time,
thoughtful criticisms and support.
I. Gravel v. United States 408 U.S. 606, 639 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (quoting W. WILSON,

CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT

303-04 (1885)).

2. In this Note, the term "representative" includes both Senators and members of
the House of Representatives at the federal level.
3. "[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House [the Senators and Representatives]
shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 6, cl.
I.
4. See, e.g., Doe v McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1972) (Public Printer and Superintendent of Documents not immune from suit for publicly distributing committee report which republished a libel because such an act "is not part of [the] deliberative
process").
5. See, e.g., id. (stating that republishing a libel is not a part of the legislative
process).
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or the legislative function.' It is recognized, though, that representatives have other official duties outside the legislative process.
These nonlegislative duties consume much of a representative's
workday. 8 Yet, action taken pursuant to these nonlegislative duties receives no protection.'
This Note examines the problems raised by this lack of protection from civil damage suits arising from acts within a representative's official but nonlegislative duties. Part I explains how
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has handled this problem. 10 Part II explores the policy
reasons behind immunity for officials in the executive and judicial
branches and shows how these reasons also support immunity for
representatives." Support for extending the doctrine to representatives will be garnered from analogous case law and the structure
of the Constitution in Part III.2 And finally, in Part IV, this Note
proposes the type of immunity that should be afforded to representatives, and explains how one case, Chastain v. Sundquist, 3
would have fared under the proposed standard. 4

6. See, e.g., id. at 316 (stating that the legislative function does not include using
and disseminating actionable material).
7. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1971) ("That Senators
generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily
make all such acts legislative in nature."); Chastain v. Sundquist, No. 85-4037 (D.D.C.
April 9, 1986) (counsel for Chastain agreeing that letters to Attorney General and Legal
Services Corporation were within Member of Congress' duties), reprinted in Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, app. 51a, 53a, Chastain v. Sundquist, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988) (No. 871756) [hereinafter Petition); Karchin v. Metzenbaum, 587 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(senator immune from suit when performing official function of dealing with letters from
constituents); R. DAVIDSON, THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESSMAN 109 (1969) (the job of a
member of Congress embraces many roles); infra text accompanying notes 82-84, 90.
8. C. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN AND His CONSTITUENTS, 54-55 (1963). Clapp
quotes one Congressman as saying "There are many members who have been here a long
time who still devote 90 percent of their time to case work." Id. at 54. Another suggested
that things were so bad that "[iut is too bad we don't have two members of Congress for
each district, with one having the responsibility for handling constituent requests, the other
being free to study legislation and to legislate." Id. at 55.
9. See Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2914 (1988).
10.

See supra notes 15-49 and accompanying text.

l1. See supra notes 50-98 and accompanying text.
12.

See supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.

13.

833 F.2d at 311.

14.

See supra notes 121-138 and accompanying text.
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RECENT WORD ON OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR
REPRESENTATIVES

A.

The Congressman, Chastain and Their Litigation

On November 6, 1987, the District of Columbia Circuit, by a
vote of two to one, held that "[w]hen (representatives) move beyond the requirements of their legislative responsibilities, they do
so . . .at their own risk,"15 and refused to extend judicially created official immunity to representatives. Chastain v. Sundquist 6

originated as an action for "tortious injury" in the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia. 7 The plaintiff, Wayne Chastain, a
Memphis Area Legal Services (MALS) attorney, based his action
on letters that Congressman Donald Sundquist wrote and later
submitted to a Memphis, Tennessee, newspaper, the Commercial
Appeal."s

Originally, MALS and the Juvenile Court of the City of
Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, had been involved in a
dispute over the collection of child support payments.1 9 In per-

forming part of his duty as a Congressman, Sundquist wrote to
William French Smith, Attorney General of the United States at

the time, noting his concern that the MALS actions may have
involved the obstruction of the Child Support Enforcement laws.2 °

The letter alleged that Chastain was hired "to do nothing but harass" a juvenile court judge and two court referees. 2 1 Later, relating similar concerns in a letter to Legal Services Corporation
15. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2914 (1988). The majority consisted of Judges Buckley and Williams with Judge
Mikva dissenting. Id. at 312.
16. Id.
17. Complaint for Damages, Chastain v. Sunquist, No. 85-4037 (D.D.C. Apr. 9,
1986) [hereinafter Complaint], reprinted in Petition, supra note 7, app. at 60a.
18. Petition, supra note 7, at 60a-61a, 63a.
19. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 312. The MALS claimed "that indigent parents under
custodial interrogation for non-payment of support are entitled to counsel .
Id.
20. Id. at 312-13.
21. Id. at 313.
Also MALS seems to be employing at least one attorney, Wayne Chastain, to do
nothing but harass Juvenile Court Judge Kenneth A. Turner and court referees
Curtis S. Person Jr. and William Ray Ingram. Mr. Chastain works in concert
with two convicted felons, Paul A. Savarin and Richard E. Love. These individuals and Mrs. Alma Morris, the MALS client counsel chairperson, call frequent
press conferences and stage street demonstrations against the Juvenile Court.
Id. (quoting Letter from Donald Sundquist to William French Smith, January 14, 1985,
[hereinafter Letter], reprinted in Brief for Appellant at 12, Chastain v. Sundquist, 833
F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (No. 86-5386), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988)).
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(LSC) Operations Committee Chairman Michael Wallace, Sund-

quist did not mention Chastain but did prompt an LSC investigation.22 Following the investigation, Sundquist held a press conference to announce the investigator's findings and stated that it was
"even worse" than he had imagined.2" The letter to the Attorney
General and a press release regarding the press conference were

released to Memphis area news media, including the Commercial
Appeal.24

After Chastain filed his complaint, Sundquist successfully removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.2 5 District Court Judge Charles Richey granted

a motion to dismiss filed by Sundquist because "those letters...
are entitled to

. .

.[protection under] the doctrine of absolute im-

munity for common law torts under well-established and long-es-"
tablished principles of law. .. ."26 On appeal to the District of

Columbia Circuit, Chastain won a reversal on the grounds that
the judicially created doctrine of official immunity does not apply
to legislators acting outside of their legislative sphere.2 7 Sundquist

then submitted a petition for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing in banc.28 The petition was denied when a majority of
judges in active service did not approve it on January 27, 1988.29

22. Id. at 313; Complaint, reprinted in Petition, supra note 7, app. at 622-632.
23. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 313.
24. Complaint, reprinted in Petition, supra note 7, app. at 61a, 63a. In addition to
the Commercial Appeal, the press releases were released to five television stations in the
Memphis area. Id. at 61a.
25. Petition, supra note 7, at 4.
26. Chastain v. Sundquist, No. 85-4037 (D.D.C. April 9, 1986), reprinted in Petition, supra note 7, at 54a. The District Court also held that the speech or debate clause
protected the letters. Id. at 542. In light of the wording of the speech or debate clause, see
supra note 3, and the holding in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), that the
speech or debate clause does not create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside legislative chambers), the part of Judge Richey's decision dealing with the speech or debate clause was clearly in error.
27. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 328 ("it is this clear distinction between inherent and
elective duties that disqualifies members of Congress for the grant of official immunity.").
28. Petition, supra note 7, at 1.
29. Id. at 58a. Six judges voted for the rehearing, five voted against it. Id. A rehearing in banc, however, will be granted only when
[a] majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service . . .order
that an appeal or other proceeding be . . . reheard by the court of appeals in
banc. Such a . . . rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
except (1)when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.
FED. R. App. P. 35(a). Chief Judge Wald and Judges Robinson, Mikva, Edwards, Ruth B.
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On June 30, 1988, Sundquist's petition for a writ of certiorariwas
denied by the Supreme Court of the United States with three justices dissenting.30 The case was then remanded to the district

court for further proceedings according to the court of appeals'
ruling.2
B.

Why Sundquist Lost

The court of appeals based its holding on the issue of official
immunity primarily on two Supreme Court cases: 32 Hutchinson v.
Proxmire3 and Doe v. McMillan.34 The Proxmire Court was not
directly faced with the issue of official immunity. 5 The Court
held that defamatory statements made outside "either House"

were also outside the sphere of the speech or debate clause because they are not involved in the deliberative process.' In Doe,
which involved the Superintendent of Documents and the Public
Printer, who are not representatives, the Court held that "republishing a libel . . . is not an essential part of the legislative pro-

cess," 37 and that there was no immunity for acts done outside this
process. 8 Combining these two cases, the Chastain court, held

that there is no immunity for representatives other than that

Ginsburg and Starr voted to grant the rehearing while Judges Silberman, Buckley, Williams, D.H. Ginsburg and Sentelle voted to deny rehearing. However, at the time there was
a twelfth circuit judge in regular active service, Judge Robert H. Bork, and he did not vote.
Petition, supra note 7, at 582. Judge Bork had been nominated to the Supreme Court of
the United States on July 1, 1987. Chicago Daily L. Bull., July 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
Though the Senate had refused to consent to Judge Bork's selection months before the
Sundquist motion to rehear in bane, Judge Bork never returned to the bench, leaving only
eleven judges to vote on the rehearing. Judge Bork resigned his post on February 5, 1988.
833 F.2d VII (1988). Therefore, had the vote for rehearing taken place ten days later,
Sundquist would have won the motion to rehear. Because Judge Bork would not have been
active at that time, the votes of six judges would have been enough to grant the motion.
30. Sundquist v. Chastain, 108 S.Ct. 2914 (1988). Justices White, Blackmun and
O'Connor voted to grant certiorari,while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy voted to deny it.
31. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 328.
32. Id. at 316-17.
33. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
34. 412 U.S. 306 (1972).
35. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2914 (1988). In fact, judicially created immunity was not even
raised as a defense by Proxmire. See Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 118.
36. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 130 (finding newsletters and press releases are not essential to senate deliberations).
37. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 317 (quoting Doe, 412 U.S. at 314-15).
38. Id. at 324.
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granted in the speech or debate clause. 9 In other words, judicially
created official immunity for representatives is coextensive with
the speech or debate clause.
The Chastain court continued its analysis by exploring the
policy reasons behind the speech or debate clause and the doctrine
of official immunity.40 The court first traced the speech or debate
clause to its English origins.4 ' The court then examined an En-

glish case holding a member of Parliament liable for republication
of a libellous speech originally made in Parliament.42 This case
demonstrated how the English equivalent of the speech or debate
clause had not been extended to cover acts that were not legislative in nature, and how no extra-Clause immunity had been
granted.43 The Chastain court thought that Sundquist had an
even weaker position as his remarks were not originally made in
Congress.44 The majority also contended that the policy reasons
that underlie the doctrine of official immunity - the need for efficiency and good government 45 - do not apply to members of

Congress.46 Legislative functions, unlike executive and judicial
functions they noted, do not include acts that create a risk of suit
not already covered by the speech or debate clause.4 7 The court
concluded by observing that the constitution protects representatives adequately,4 8 and that no other circuit precedent contra49
dicted its holding.

39. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 316 ("[T]he speech or debate clause has been seen as
sufficient to protect the functional obligations of elected representatives.").
40.

Id. at 319-325.

41. Id. at 319-21. An English equivalent to the speech or debate clause has been
included in the English Bill of Rights since 1688. Id. at 319.
42.

Id. at 319-20 (citing The King v. Creevey, 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K.B. 1813)).

43.

Id.

44. Id. at 319 ("[T]his case presents a less equivocal claim in that the letter published to the press
did not . . . replicate a speech made in congress.").
45. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
46.

Chastain, 833 F.2d at 322.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 324-25.

49. Id. at 325-27 (The court refuted the dissent's argument that the case was controlled by McSureley v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005
(1985), and Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036
(1984).).
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ALL OF THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHOULD BE PROTECTED

A. The Current State of Judicially Created Official Immunity
Judicially created immunity5" is afforded to judges, prosecutors, members of the executive. branch involved in adjudicative
functions,"' 51 the President, 52 and other members of the executive

branch.5 3 Whether the immunity is absolute or qualified depends
on the function of the recipient54 and the type of violation alleged. 5 5 Underlying these factors are the courts' attempts to balance the availability of remedies for aggrieved parties against the
societal costs of litigation against federal officials.56
Absolute immunity protects government officials from all
lawsuits, providing the officials act within the "outer perimeters of
their official duties."' 57 Such officials would be protected from any

lawsuits that result from their job, but not from lawsuits that arise
from actions that are extraneous to their jobs. Qualified immunity
protects government officials from constitutionally or statutorily
based actions when the officials have not violated clearly established law. 58 Here a government official is likely to be protected
from charges that are based on ambiguous or new and uninterpreted law, while not being protected from violations of "basic un50. While I agree that it should be left to Congress to "legislatively create" immunity, this would be a very easy proposition to hide behind. Instead, recognizing that the
Chastaincourt was faced with congressional silence, this Note argues that the reasons that
support judicially created immunity for members of the executive and judicial branches
apply equally well to members of the legislative branch, and that the courts have been
inconsistent in applying their own doctrine.
51. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1981).
52. Id.
53. E.g., Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
54. E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810. See generally Woolhandler, Patternsof Official
Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1986-87) (stating that the
Court's evaluation of an officer's claim for immunity may focus on the possible harms that
performance of the official function may inflict).
55. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 315-16.
56. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1981).
[T]he recognition of [an] . . .immunity defense . . . reflected an attempt to
balance competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, but also "the need to protect officials who are required
to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the
vigorous exercise of official authority."
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 506 (1974) (citations omitted)).
57. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 315.
58. Id.
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questioned constitutional rights."5 9
All executive and judicial branch officials receive absolute
immunity for common-law tort actions.6 0 Those who perform ad-

judicative, 6 or extremely sensitive (normally executive branch)
functions 62 also receive absolute immunity for constitutionally or
statutorily based'actions. Those executive branch officials who do

not have absolute immunity are afforded qualified immunity for
constitutionally or statutorily based allegations.6 3 This is the func-

tional division. In determining if a particular official is immune
from a specific charge, the official is fit first into one of the two

functional categories: those who perform adjudicatory or extremely sensitive functions, and those who do not. If the actor is
only eligible for qualified immunity, the harm claimed is rooted in
a violation of constitutional or statutory rights, and the area of
law is clearly established, immunity will not be extended. In all
other circumstances it will be extended. Thus, executive and judicial officials have some degree of immunity for all of their official
duties.
Representatives, however, enjoy all-or-nothing immunity with
respect to civil damage suits arising from their actions, even if
they are operating within the scope of their official duties. When

they are "legislating," the speech or debate clause' grants repre59. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815. Until Harlow, as part of the "clearly established law"
prong of the qualified immunity test, courts had applied a subjective good faith standard to
determine whether the official acted with malicious intention. Id. The Harlow Court eliminated this part of the test, which was set forth in Wood v. Strickland, 408 U.S. 308, 322
(1975). The Harlow Court concluded that the subjective element may allow insubstantial
claims to get to trial and dilute the effectiveness of the immunity doctrine. Harlow, 457
U.S. at 815-19.
60. E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807-08.
61. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1977) (chief hearing examiner and
judicial officer of the Department of Agriculture immune for recommending that administrative complaint be sustained); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (prosecutor immune
from suit for deciding to prosecute); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871)
(criminal court judge immune from action resulting from judge's striking of an attorney's
name from the role).
62. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1981) (President immune from suit
alleging that a departmental reorganization ordered by the President that cost respondent
his job was in retaliation to respondent's congressional testimony); Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959) (Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization given absolute privilege from libel action based on press release announcing employees' terminations); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895) (immunity for Postmaster General for official
communications).
63. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerlad, 457 U.S. 800, 807 ("For executive officials in general
• . . qualified imiunity represents the norm.").
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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sentatives absolute immunity, 5 Yet, according to Chastain, when
representatives are airing constituent grievances to administrative
agencies, pointing out waste in government or otherwise acting in
their representative role, they have no immunity.66 When the policies furthered by judicially created immunity are examined and
considered in light of the currently non-immune representative
role of representatives, the inconsistency in denying representatives this protection becomes apparent.
B.

The Reasons Behind Judicially Created Immunity for
Executive and Judicial Branch Officials

The Constitution does not provide immunity for members of
the executive or judicial branches from suits arising out of their
official or unofficial activities.67 The Supreme Court, though, has
extended immunity to executive and judicial branch officials.6 8
Whether the immunity is qualified or absolute depends on the particular act and the level of the official's responsibility."
There are two veins of policy behind the official immunity
doctrine. The first vein addresses the concern that without immunity, suits brought against government officials "would consume
time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service .... -7o This vein will be referred to as "efficiency". The other vein addresses the concern that an official
,"should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of
inquiry in a civil suit for damages. [This apprehension] would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public
affairs . . . . ,, This vein will be referred to as "good government." These reasons have been held to outweigh the corresponding loss of a potential damage recovery to individuals who lose

65. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
66. See Chastain, 833 F.2d at 314.
67. The only immunity granted in the Constitution is that found in the speech or
debate clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
68. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.

69. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978) (examining function
of official. to determine extent of immunity); Woolhandler, supra note 54, at 396-97; supra
notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
70. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
71. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); see, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (immunity for judges based on idea that judges should be as
independent as possible from any conceivable source of pressure).
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their right to sue. One court has explained this situation as follows: "It has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who
try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."7 2
The efficiency problem in subjecting officials to suit in all
cases is self-evident considering the heavy schedules of officials
without such time-consuming litigation. Consider the problem as
it relates to the judiciary. Judge Richard A. Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit notes:
All that is clear is that the federal caseload cannot be allowed to
grow for long at the extraordinary rates of the past quarter-century without putting an end to the federal court system in its
present form. At an annual rate of growth of 5.6 percent - the
average rate of growth of the district courts' docket since 1960 it will take only ten years (from 1983) for their annual case
filings to amount to almost 500,000, and by the year 2000 they
will be 700,000.'3

With such a backlog, if judges were stripped of their absolute immunity the judiciary could well come to a standstill. The additional time that judges would spend with counsel, in depositions
and in trial on behalf of their own defense would further burden a
beleagured system.74

72.
(1950).

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 949

73. R. POSNER,

THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM

94 (1985). Judge Posner

continues: "The corresponding figures for the courts of appeals, based on their average
growth rate since 1960 of 9.4 percent are 73,000 and 136,236, and for the Supreme Court,
based on its rate (3.6 percent) 5,983 and 7,664." Id.
Judge Posner's extrapolations are more frightening when one notes that the courts
have reacted to burgeoning caseloads by resorting to short-cuts. One of these is the "controversial . . . practices of disposing of some cases without a published decision, a practice
that has been adopted to some extent by all federal appellate courts." D. Sienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems Of Access And Use In The Courts Of Appeals 2 (1985)
(unpublished manuscript) reprinted in The Role of the Appellate Opinion: Communicating
What to Whom?, a collection of papers distributed at a panel discussion held at the Federal Judicial Center Conference at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law,
October 23, 1989. What would be sacrificed if the judicial branch were not immune from
suit?
74. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871).
If upon such allegations a judge could be compelled to answer in a civil action
for his judicial acts, not only would his office be degraded and his usefulness
destroyed, but he would be subjected for his protection to the necessity of preserving a complete record of all the evidence produced before him in every litigated case, and of the authorities cited and arguments presented, in order that
he might be able to show to the judge before whom he might be summoned by
the losing party-and that judge perhaps one of inferior jurisdiction-that he had
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The apprehension problem that could result if officials were
not immune from suit when working within the outer-perimeters
of their authority was perhaps best described by Judge Learned
Hand:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in
fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or
for any other personal motive not connected with the public
good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so
cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried,
and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties. 5
The basis of tort law is that when a person knows that their act
may invite suit, they will act much more hesitantly, 1 and one can
argue that this threat of litigation will promote good government.
But on the other hand, it is argued that government cannot function properly when officials act hesitantly. 7 The prioritizing of
good government before the normal implication of tort liability is
the basis for the second vein of reasoning behind official
immunity.
C.

The Roles of Representatives

The Constitution lists the housekeeping duties18 and the substantive powers1 9 of both Houses as well as the limitations placed

decided as he did with judicial integrity; and the second judge would be subjected to a similar burden, as he in his turn might also be held amenable by the
losing party.
75. Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581.
76. A "generally accepted theory, is that the law began by making a person act at
his peril if he caused . . . harm." PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ, TORTS - CASES AND
MATERIALS

1 (7th ed.* 1987).

77. "Public officials. . . who fail to make decisions when they are needed to or who
do not act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform
the duties of their offices." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1974).

78. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
79. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; id. art I, § 8; id. amend. XIII; id. amend. XIV,
§ 5; id. amends. XV-XVI; id. amends. XVIII-XX; id. amends. XXIII-XXVI.
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upon them.80 But the Constitution is silent about the roles of the

individual representatives.81 It might be that this lack of a "job
description," as much as basic differences of opinion, is why it
might be rare to find a clear consensus on how many roles a representative has, what they are and what actions they may include.
While the following examination of the legislator's role is not universal, it is a sound frame of reference for this Note.
A role is a person's normal or expected behavior when they
are in a particular environment.8 2 By using the acts that representatives undertake as the characteristic that defines their environment, we can define two broad roles. The legislative role is
found in the environment that encompasses a representative's

writing, researching and voting on legislation. The environment in
which a representative deals with constituent problems in a nonlegislative (representative or errand-boy)83 manner encompasses
the representative role.84 If a representative were dealing with an
administrative agency because of a constituent's grievance, therefore, the representative would be in the representative role. If the
representative were conferring with the administrative agency on
pending legislation, the representative would be in the legislative
role.

With this background set, the next problem is identifying
which actions of representatives should be protected, if any. The

answer lies partially in the speech or debate clause85 and its most
recent interpretation, Hutchinson v. Proxmire.86 Proxmire, like

80. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. amend. I.
81. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1.
82. See R. DAVIDSON, supra note 7, at 73.
83. Id. at 109.
84. It could be said that a representative is acting in a representative role even when
legislating, because legislating also entails representing constituent's interests. But this
would lump all of a representative's functions into one role, and even representatives themselves do not perceive this to be so. An extensive study of the roles of representatives conducted by the Brookings Institution frequently refers to the differences between and tradeoffs of the representatives and legislative roles. See C. CLAPP, supra note 8, at 50 (stating
that legislators spend increasingly more time on representative functions than on legislative
functions). It notes that the representative role is often carried out at the expense of the
legislative role. Id. at 51, 53, 55-56; cf. Clark, The Wonderful World of Congress, in
STUDIES ON CONGRESS 1 (1969) (stating that what people expect of congress as a body
conflicts with what constituents demand of their individual representatives). The study was
based on interviews and roundtable discussions with thrity-six representatives. See C.
CLAPP, supra note 8, at 102.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
86. 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979).
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the speech or debate clause, discusses only those acts that fall
under the legislative role. 87 Whether any acts within the representative role should be protected and, if so, which ones, are the next
questions to be addressed. To answer these questions, the applicability of the reasoning behind immunity to acts within the representative role will be examined.
D. The Reasons for Judicially Created Official Immunity Are
Equally Applicable to the Nonlegislative Functions of
Representatives
Both of the policy reasons for granting official immunity for
executive and judicial branch officials are applicable to representatives. The efficiency problems that would hamper the performance of executive branch officials and members of the judiciary if
they were open to suit also affect representatives. After Chastain,88 representatives would be smart to hesitate before acting
outside of the legislative arena, a hesitancy that would be shared
by other government officials carrying out their official duties if
they were stripped of their immunity from suit for civil damages.
Thus, the reasoning that supports judicially created official immunity for the executive and judicial branches also supports official
immunity for representatives.
As mentioned previously the Supreme Court has held that
absolute immunity from suits emanating from legislative acts by
representatives is provided by the speech or'debate clause.89 As a
result, the doctrine of official immunity is needed only to protect
representatives from civil suits arising from nonlegislative actions.
The representative role, as outlined in the previous section, consumes much of a representative's time. Roger Davidson has found
that a number of representatives "emphasize the so-called Errand
Boy functions and the other constituency-oriented [representational] tasks."8 " Official immunity would not just be a token gesture in this area but a doctrine that would cover many activities
that could lead to suit.

87. , See supra text accompanying note 36.
88. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2914 (1988).
89. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (holding that a speech
given in the senate would be covered by absolute immunity); supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
90. R. DAvIDsoN, supra note 7, at 109.
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The workload of Congressmen is already heavy and likely
will get heavier.9 ' Using the length of Congressional sessions as a
measure of workload, it is clear that this is true. Twenty of the
twenty-two Congressional sessions that lasted at least one year as
of 1986 occurred since 1940.92 One commentator notes: "The
1960's seem to have marked the advent of the year-round session
as a common fact of Capitol Hill life: . . . Longer sessions were

accompanied by longer working days, more bills, more new statutes, more constituent requests, and broader scope of activity trends that are not likely to be reversed. 19 3 Efficiency is at a premium for representatives. While, as Judge Mikva admitted in his
dissent in Chastain, "[Congressmen] will not frequently provoke
civil actions by angry or resentful persons," 94 even the occasional
loss of time due to the need to defend civil damage suits by a few
representatives will further reduce Congressional efficiency. The
impact on the individual representatives will be great. Besides the
time put into a trial itself, the amount of time need for pretrial
preparation could make it impossible for representatives to maintain their current level of work: one which, as noted above, is
growing." A significant amount of efficiency could be gained by
extending official immunity to representative acts of representatives within the outer-perimeter of their duties.
If the Chastain reasoning is widely accepted, representatives
will think long and hard before performing any nonlegislative acts
that are commonplace but unnecessary. Looking into wasteful expenditures 6 and reports of harassment of judges" are acts that
constituents expect expect of their representatives. Because these
acts do not take place within "either House" and therefore are not
protected by immunity, representatives faced with the possibility
of civil 'damage suits may avoid looking into these wrongs alto-

91. See id. at 66-68 (the Congressional workload has risen and Congressional sessions have lengthened).
92. 1989-90 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 101ST CONGRESS, 520-29. For
this calculation, a year is 340 calendar days or more as Congress does its best to take at
least three to four weeks between sessions in December and January. Id.
93. R. DAVIDSON, supra note 7, at 68.
94. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 332 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. The great demand on representatives'
time could increase even more if they faced a trial by media.
96. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (Senator Proxmire publicized examples of wasteful governmental spending).
97. See Chastian, 833 F.2d at 311 (Representative Sundquist reporting his belief
that a juvenile court judge was being harassed).
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gether. Those who do venture to investigate will certainly not do
so with the vigor that they should, for the legal threat will
"dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or most irresponsible .

"'

...

The policy justifications for official immunity for the executive and judicial branches have equal force in protecting representatives acting in their representative role. Without this immunity, representatives will be more reluctant to perform
representative functions. When, they do act, they will be faced
with a potential time burden that could paralyze their office. The
threat of civil damages may even be enough to keep them out of
Congress altogether. Official immunity for representatives is a
sound doctrine that will increase representative efficiency and remove the doubts that representatives have about the consequences
of their representative actions. This, in turn, will promote good
government.
III.

OTHER SUPPORT FOR OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FOR
REPRESENTATIVES

A. Same Act, Different Immunity
Not only does the reasoning behind the doctrine of official
immunity support a similar doctrine for representatives, but some
of the decisions favoring immunity involve factual situations that
representatives may face also. For example, in Barr v. Matteo,99
the acting director of the Office of Rent Stabilization issued a
press release indicating that he was going to suspend certain
agency employees because of their role in formulating a pay plan
that would violate the spirit of a law governing these payments. 0 6
The acting director was sued for libel based on the contents of the
press release,'' and the Court held that "petitioner's plea of absolute privilege in defense of alleged libel published at his discretion
must be sustained. °2
There is no material reason why the Court's ruling could not
be applied to representatives. Chastain, however, indicates that
there is no immunity for representatives beyond that granted in
98. Chastain, 833 F.2d at 322 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 949 (1950)).
99. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

100. Id. at 565-67.
101.
102.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 574.
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the speech or debate clause.103 A representative, therefore, could
be liable for issuing a press release regarding the firing of a representative's aide who conspired to embezzle funds from the representatives campaign fund. Because the publication would not be a
legislative act no speech or debate clause protection would apply. 104 Thus, an elected official, who can be removed directly by
the people, would be vulnerable to suit while an appointed official
who performs the same act and who cannot be removed directly
by the people, is immune.
B. A Middle Ground in the Supreme Court?
In deciding whether or not official immunity should be afforded to representatives when they are charged. with criminal violations, the Supreme Court in Gravel v. United States'0 5 hinted
that official immunity may be appropriate in civil suits.' 06 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had held that
Barr-type immunity, which protectes executive officials from libel
suits, 0 7 was applicable to representatives to "the extent that a
[representative] has responsibility to inform his constituents."' 10 8
The Gravel Court opined, "we cannot carry a judicially fashioned
privilege so far as to immunize criminal conduct." 0 9 The plain
language of the opinion indicates that while such immunity cannot
foreclose criminal liability, there is a middle ground to which this
privilege can apply. That middle ground may well be immunity
from civil suits.
The identification of the outer-limit of official immunity as
criminal conduct" 0 is consistent with the proposed immunity for

103. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2914 (1988).
104. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (stating that the objective of the clause is to protect only legislative activities).
105. 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (neither absolute nor qualified immunity extends to protect interference with the criminal process or grand jury investigations).
106. Id. at 627 (privilege protecting a congressman from a civil suit, such as libel,
cannot extend to immunity from criminal conduct).
107. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (petitioner, who was acting director of
a government agency, was protected by an absolute privilege against a libel suit); supra
text accompanying notes 99-102.
108. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 627 (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st
Cir. 1972)).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See id.
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representatives."1 ' Because neither of the policies behind representative immunity - efficiency or good government - would be
served by immunizing criminal conduct, representative immunity

would not go so far as to include these actions. Gravel is therefore
analogous to the proposal in this Note, defining the outer, limit of

immunity.
C. Constitutional Consistency
The Chastain court thought that Sundquist's arguments
"would reject the sufficiency of the constitutional schema""' 2 by
forging new immunity for representatives. x" This ruling makes
the doctrine of judicially created official immunity look, at best,
very inconsistent.
The immunity that has been previously extended to the exec-

utive and judicial branches is judicially created and not constitutionally required." 4 Yet, when courts have granted immunity to

executive and judicial branch members, the immunity has not
been found to be at odds with the constitutional schema.
It does not appear to be a huge logical leap to argue that
because only representatives received immunity in the Constitution, the Framers thought they needed the most protection. The
Chastain court, it seems, has decided that the Framers missed the

mark on this point. The current judicially created protections for
the other two branches now arguably exceeds that provided for
representatives. Apparently, though, inequality in doling out of
immunity does fit within the constitutional schema.

11. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
Of course, a situation could probably be imagined where there might be some merit to
immunizing criminal conduct. For example, a representative might represent constituents
who vigorously oppose a recently enacted anti-flag-burning law which makes it a federal
crime to burn an American flag. In order to test the constitutionality of the law, the representative might burn an American flag at a rally with the intent of being convicted to
create a test case to challenge the law. While their may be merit in this type of civil
disobedience, this behavior would still be unprotected under the proposal in this Note. The
author's answer to those who advocate immunization of such conduct would be that the
representative could attempt to achieve the same result through other, non-criminal measures (Le., a declaratory judgment action).
112. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F. 2d 311, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2914 (1988).
113. Id. (the extension of immunity to representatives would "add a novel judicial
protection").
114. "[Tlhe Court has fashioned an extra-Constitutional body of immunity law to
supplement the grants of immunity contained in the Constitution." Id. at 315.
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A Forgotten Case?

Aside from the consistency that would be gained, the Barrrepresentative analogy, provides examples of practical application
and logic that buoy the case for granting immunity to representatives' representative functions. These points could have been the
basis for the holding in a district court case, Karchin v. Metzenbaum."15 In that case, official immunity was extended to a Senator
for actions which were clearly outside the sphere of the speech or
debate clause."' A disgruntled constituent, Milton Karchin, sued
Senator Metzenbaum for the mishandling of a complaint that he
had sent to Metzenbaum's office." 7 Judge Sam H. Bell of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
dealt with the immunity issue concisely:
Metzenbaum is immune from suit. He is a United States Senator. He and his staff perform an official function in dealing with
letters from constituents. They act within the scope of their discretionary authority.
• . . The immunity defense which may be raised by a government official is limited to protection against challenges to his
conduct while performing an official function .... "I
The Chastain libel suit, like Karchin's suit, is a common law
tort action. The extension of immunity to the type of suit in

115. 587 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
116. Id. at 566.
117. Id. at 564. Karchin wrote to Senator Metzenbaum on September 19, 1982, explaining that he had tried to secure a promotion in the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense
Contract Administration Service Region of Cleveland several times and was denied each
time. He then requested the rating sheets for himself and the other applicants from the
executive officer of the local Army Recruiting Command Office. Again, he received no
response. His letter also complained of questionable promotion practices within the agency
and waste in the department.
Karchin enclosed copies of two travel vouchers that he believed should not have been
approved. Senator Metzenbaum's staff forwarded the letter and the copies of the travel
vouchers to the Secretary of the Army asking for an inquiry. As a result of the inquiry,
Karchin received a notice of proposed suspension for reproducing and disclosing travel
vouchers, a violation of the agency's standard of conduct. At the time of the decision
Karchin was fighting the proposed suspension. Id. at 565.
118. Id. at 566. The court misinterpreted Harlow and only applied qualified immunity. Karchin asserted that his "constitutional rights to petition members of Congress and
to be secure in his papers [were] violated [and] that Metzenbaum failed in a duty to warn
constituents that mail received by his office might not be kept confidential." Id. at 564. The
first two charges are constitutionally based, so qualified immunity applies. The last charge,
though, stated as a violation of a duty to warn, is a common law allegation to which absolute immunity would apply. It was this charge on which the court dealt with the immunity
issue. Id. at 564.
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Karchin is obviously at odds with Chastain. While Karchin is not
binding but only persuasive authority with respect to Chastain,
that is to the extent that the District of Columbia Circuit gives
any weight to the judgments of the Northern District of Ohio,
Karchin is one of two cases most similar to Chastain; the other
being Barr.119 Yet, the Chastain majority failed even to mention
Karchin in its analysis.12 °
Had the Karchin suit been decided as Chastain was, Senator
Metzenbaum would have had no immunity because the act complained of was clearly not within the legislative process. In an effort to avoid further liability, Senator Metzenbaum's natural reaction might have been to stamp all future mail "return to sender."
This would likely infuriate constituents. Not only would immunity
for representatives benefit the representative, but it would benefit
the constituents by promoting "good government."
The arguments presented here strongly support the proposition that the Chastain majority rejected: the nonlegislative acts of
representatives should be protected by the doctrine of official immunity. For no acceptable reason, Chastain denies representatives
immunity when the policy reasons behind immunity for executive
and judicial branch officials also apply to representatives. The following section offers a solution to the problems Chastain has
created.
E. Proposal: Refining the Official Duties of Representatives
The judicially created official immunity given to executive officials and judges121 should be extended to representatives. Under
this immunity, representatives would be absolutely immune from
common-law torts absolutely, as loni as "their actions fall within
the outer perimeter of their official duties." '22 They also would be
immune from alleged constitutional and statutory violations as
long as their actions do'not violate "clearly established" law. 2
Present definitions of "official duties" that limit representa119. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. Karchin is similar to Chastain in the immunity to representatives and representative-constituent aspects, while Barr is similar as to the allegation: libel by a government

official.
120. Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 311-328 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2914 (1988).

121. See id. at 315.
122. See id.

123. See id.
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tives' official duties to legislative acts11 4 should be rejected. The
official duties of representatives should include both legislative and
representative acts. Because legislative acts already are protected
by the speech or debate clause, 125 changing the scope of the judicially created immunity would extend protection to the representative acts of senators and congressman. The outer-perimeter of
representatives' official duties would reach all attempts to inform
constituents or represent their grievances. What specific acts
would fit under this description would have to be determined on a
case-by-case basis, as are the acts that constitute the official duties
of members of the executive and judicial branches.
The test proposed for determining when an alleged constitutional or statutory violation is not protected by official immunity
-

i.e., a violation of "clearly established" law -

is the test set

26

forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.1 The Court has articulated the
standard as whether an official "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he'took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]."127

This rule gives representatives the minimum amount of immunity
necessary to carry out their official duties.
A number of examples will bring this proposal into better focus. First, if a representative punched a heckler at a press conference, he would not be immune from suit for two reasons. One
reason is that battery is a criminal offense, and no such acts are
protected under this proposal. Another is that although a common
law tort action exists for battery, immunity would be granted here
only if the act leading to the tort was within the scope of the representative's official duties. While the press conference was within
the representative's official duties of the representative as part of
his informing function, the act of battery does not advance the
purpose of the press conference and therefore no immunity would
be granted.
A more commonplace example is if a representative issued a
press release stating that her staff treasurer had been suspended
while being investigated for charges of embezzlement when, in
fact, it is discovered later that no embezzlement took place. This
statement would expose the treasurer to "contempt, hatred, ridi-

124.
125.
126.
127.

E.g., Doe v. MeMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1972).
E.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire 443 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
457 U.S. 800 (1981).
Id. at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975)).

1989-901

FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE IMMUNITY

1129

' providing a basis for a common-law
cule or obloquy,"128
defamation action. But the announcement was done in furtherance of the
operation of the representative's office by letting the representative's constituents know how she is handling an incident that has
at least indirectly harmed those who have contributed to her office, an act within the official duties of a representative. Absolute
immunity, therefore, would apply.
Next, suppose the same employee sues the representative on
constitutional or statutory grounds, alleging that the firing was
discriminatory. Because legislators do not perform adjudicatory or
extremely sensitive 29 functions, only qualified immunity would be
available here due to the constitutional or statutory nature of the
violation. Also, immunity would be extended only if the law is not
clearly established, or if the representative did not know or could
not reasonably have known about the law. (By definition, a representative would appear to be the last person who could claim not
to know of the law!) If the particular provision is fairly settled
law, our representative will not be able to cloak herself in immunity. Anti-discrimination laws are well-known and a federal representative would most likely know about them. The representative,
therefore, would be held to have known about the- law.
The result would be' different if the particular provision has
been interpreted two different ways by different federal appellate
courts, has never been interpreted by the Supreme Court, and is
at least arguably ambiguous. Here, immunity would be granted,
because it could not be said that the law was clearly established.

IV. APPLICATION OF PROPOSAL TO CHASTAIN V. SUNDQUIST

The Chastaincase itself provides a good example of how this
proposal would work. Chastain filed a complaint alleging five
counts of libel, all common-law allegations.' a No constitutional or
statutory violations were alleged.' 3' Under this Note's proposal,
Sundquist would be granted absolute immunity if the allegedly
libelous action was within his official duties. Acts performed in his
representative role are within his official duties. Sundquist's ac128.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (Ab. 5th Ed. 1983) (defining defamation).
129. Working on a Congressional committee on sensitive matters of national security
would arguably rise to the level of an extremely sensitive function, but such a case would
probably he handled under the speech or debate clause. U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1.
130. Complaint, reprinted in Petition, supra note 7, app. at 60a-68a.
131. Id.
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tions were in response to a constituent's concern and therefore
were within his representative role. 132 Chastain even conceded
that the letters were within Sundquist's official duties. 133 Sundquist's actions, therefore, would be granted an absolute privilege
of immunity.
The only question remaining would be whether or not issuing
a press release was within Sundquist's official duties. This question
has been addressed by the Court in Barr v. Matteo.3 4 The published letter in Barr was protected even though publication was
not necessary to complete the officials task." 5 There had been a
great deal of public debate on the plan in question in Barr,136 and
the Court apparently felt that this justified publication. 3 In
Chastain, there was similar public uproar, including "statements
and counter-statements by public officials, charges in the media,
and a number of lawsuits other than this one."' 8 With Barr as
precedent, the publication also would be privileged and the case
dismissed.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of judicially created official immunity has been
selectively applied up to now. Depending on which role they are
working in, representatives have not been among the chosen ones.
Unlike executive officials or members of the judiciary, representatives are constantly called upon to perform acts on behalf of their
constituents that are not protected. To ask representatives to act
for constituents and yet subject themselves to litigation in the
course of their job is unreasonable. The vigorous representation
that our government requires will be stunted if representatives become the targets of lawsuits. To give equal treatment to the offi-

132. While the facts do not specify who complained to Sundquist about MALS,
Sundquist's letter to Attorney General William French Smith opened, "It has been brought
to my attention that the Memphis Area Legal Service (MALS) is being operated in a
highly questionable manner." Letter, supra note 21.
133. Petition, supra note 7, app. at 53a.
134. 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1958).
135. Id. at 575 ("That petitioner was not required by law ..
to speak out cannot
be controlling in the case of an official of policy-making rank.").
136. Id. at 574-75.
137. Id. ("We think that under these circumstances a publicly expressed statement
of the position of the agency head . . . was an appropriate exercise of [his] discretion.").
138. Petition, supra note 7, at 2.
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cials of all three branches and grant representatives official immunity is not only fair but necessary.
J. TIMOTHY Mc

DONALD

